Spatial Interactions and the Political Economics of Public Provision: Evidence from India

Abstract

We examine the political-economics of public provision when spatial dependence is a concern. Spatial dependence might arise due to several reasons. Yardstick competition, voter mobility, or spillovers among neighbouring jurisdictions are few such reasons. Using district-level school facility data from India, we find that, on average, a district has one more primary school for every six additions in neighbouring districts. The degree of spatial dependence differs by school level, infrastructure type and geographic region. It is larger for primary schools. Spatial dependence is stronger in South India and is more pronounced for school buildings and grants. With regard to political-economic factors, schools have better infrastructure when turnout is high and the seats are safe. We also find positive effect of political reservation of disadvantaged groups on school infrastructure. Our results are robust to several checks. Thus, vertical policy coordination would reduce deadweight loss and improve efficiency in public provision..

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In Working paper.
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